In a principal-agent relationship in which the agent's cost is non-monotonic with respect to type, we introduce the possibility, for the principal, of conditioning the compensation to the agent on the realization of an ex-post signal correlated with type. The possibility of exploiting the correlation between type and signal through lotteries is nonetheless constrained by the agent's limited liability. We establish conditions for …rst-best implementation highlighting two peculiar e¤ects on contractual design. First, countervailing incentives arise, with some types being tempted to mimic higher types, others to mimic lower types. Second, for any given type, some lower types gain on cost reimbursement, if they mimic it; others lose, instead. The same occurs with higher types, if they mimic the same given type. The former e¤ect determines what exact lottery each type should be faced with, the optimal lottery di¤ering across types. The latter e¤ect implies restrictions on …rst-best implementation relative to the case of monotonic cost. This suggests that, unlike in settings without correlated information, countervailing incentives may make screening more di¢ cult, rather than facilitating it.
Introduction Motivation
In many agency relationships, the agent displays countervailing incentives to misrepresent his private information (the type), which entails that he is tempted either to overstate or to understate type depending on its speci…c realization. This is mostly the case when trading with the principal occasions an opportunity cost which is higher the better the type in that trade. For instance, when the type is the cost of producing a good for the principal, misrepresentation involves that the di¤erence between false and true production cost and that between false and true opportunity cost are of a di¤erent sign. There are thus two opposite e¤ects on incentives. Each agent's type will be eager to mimic higher or lower types depending on the extent to which the e¤ect associated with the opportunity cost and that associated with the production cost countervail each other. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [17] (henceforth, MRC) show that the prevailing e¤ect may di¤er for any given type according to the shape of the total cost, including both the production cost and the opportunity cost, and characterize the contract for all possible shapes. 1 There are many practical examples of agency problems with countervailing incentives, and it is not surprising that similar …ndings to those obtained by MRC emerge in essentially all cases explored by the literature. 2 Hitherto, the literature has focused on situations in which, after receiving the report from the agent in the contracting stage, the principal does not acquire any additional information about the agent's type during the execution of the contract. In practice, it is very likely that some signal about the agent's type becomes available after the transaction speci…ed in the contract has taken place. An authority that regulates a monopolist F in some jurisdiction learns something about the production cost by observing the output of a monopolist F' operating in a di¤erent jurisdiction. Under an incentive-compatible regulatory contract, that output re ‡ects the e¢ ciency of F'. Provided the e¢ ciency of two …rms operating in the same sector is correlated, the output of F'is also a signal of the e¢ ciency of F. The same occurs with agencies that regulate more …rms at once, all involved in the same activity, as is often the case in water 1 Jullien [12] extends the analysis of MRC by relaxing the assumption of full participation and exploring common values situations in which the private information parameter has a direct impact on the principal's welfare. 2 Examples of countervailing incentives are found: in procurement, when …rms are specialized (Boone and Schttmuller [5] ) and when they have a privileged knowledge of the quality of a public signal about their production costs (Che and Sappington [6] ); in regulation, when the …rm incurs a …xed cost inversely related with the privately known marginal cost (Lewis and Sappington [15] ), with non-linear pricing under price cap (Jullien [12] ), when two-product monopolists face complementary demands (Aguirre and Beitia [2] ) and when utilities are subject to universal service obligations (Poudou et al. [20] ); in labour and …nancial contracts, when the agent's hidden e¤ort is complementary to his privately known ability in accomplishing the task for the principal (Ollier and Thomas [19] ); in vertical relationships, when retailers need to specialize some assets before contracting with the upstream suppliers (Acconcia et al. [1] ); in con ‡icts on investment levels between uninformed shareholders and informed managers (Degryse and de Jong [9] ); in landowner-farmer contracts with up-front capital endowments (Lewis and Sappington [16] ); in government-taxpayers relationships, when the government wishes to improve the wellbeing of low-skill individuals by taxing high-skill individuals, while being aware that the latter will emigrate if their domestic utility is lower than it would be in other tax jurisdictions (Krause [13] ). and sanitation services. Moreover, sometimes the regulator draws information by auditing the …rm's activity. 3 These are all instances in which the newly acquired information is observable and veri…able and can thus be used in the contractual o¤er to the agent. The literature on mechanism design with correlated information, initiated by Crémer and McLean [7] and Riordan and Sappington [21] , has deeply investigated how the principal can take advantage of informative signals to enhance contracting. It is now well known that the use of lotteries, by means of which the compensation assigned to the di¤erent types is conveniently linked to the signals, strongly a¤ects the principal's attainments. In particular, the …rst-best outcome (full surplus extraction and e¢ cient volume of trade) might be at reach, depending on the agent's cost and level of liability (Demougin and Garvie [10] , Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [11] , Danau and Vinella [8] ). The existing studies focus on situations in which the agent's cost is monotonic in type, involving that the potential bene…t from private information to the agent is higher the better that the type is. It remains to be clari…ed how the principal can take advantage of correlated information and how that possibility a¤ects the features of the optimal contract when the cost is non-monotonic, provided in that case the change in production cost exceeds the change in opportunity cost for some types whereas the converse is true for others. The purpose of our study is to shed light on these issues.
Setting and main results
Our model bridges the domain of literature on agency problems with type-dependent opportunity cost with that on the use of correlated information in contractual design. We represent a principal who contracts with an agent for the provision of some good (or service). In the same vein as in MRC, the agent incurs both a variable cost of production, which grows linearly with the agent's type, and an opportunity cost of trading with the principal, which declines with type and can take any shape. Thus, the shape of the opportunity cost is also the shape of the total cost. A signal correlated with type is publicly observed after the production quantity has been chosen or the good supplied. The signal is hard information, which the principal can use to condition the compensation to the agent. We further assume that the agent is protected by limited liability to take into account that, in practice, agents are generally prevented from incurring serious …nancial di¢ culties. For instance, …nancial distress of regulated …rms is deemed to be undesirable in that it could lead to the interruption of services of general interest.
In line with the literature on contractual design with correlated information, we focus on …rst-best implementation and identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for that outcome to be achieved. This requires facing the agent with an appropriate incentive compatible lottery, which is only feasible as long as he can be exposed to su¢ ciently high de…cits. We are thus led to assess how the non-monotonicity of the agent's cost a¤ects the choice of the optimal lottery under limited liability.
To help comprehension of our results, which we summarize below, it is useful to recall how lotteries should be structured to attain contractual e¢ ciency. Whether the cost is monotonic (the case analyzed in Danau and Vinella [8] ) or it is not (the case analyzed in this paper), the lottery must be constructed in such a way that, …rst, the target type to is an attractive report to neither lower types nor higher types and, second, it retains all surplus. The exact structure of the lottery depends on the agent's liability and the shape of the cost with respect to type. Intuitively, when the liability is low a lottery which minimizes the risk borne by the agent (i.e., exposes the agent to the lowest feasible de…cit) is desirable. In turn, the shape of the cost determines how e¤ective a lottery is at extracting surplus. To illustrate, if the agent's cost increases with type, then by mimicking some intermediate type ; a lower type could appropriate the di¤erence between pretended cost and true cost, whereas a higher type + would lose that di¤erence. What matters is thus how the gain to type compares with the penalty to type + ; and hence how great the ratio between the two is. The magnitude of the ratio depends on the shape of the cost, and hence that shape also determines how powerful a lottery designed to prevent type from reporting is, without rendering that same report attractive to type + : When the cost is convex in type, the ratio between gain to type and penalty to type + is below one, and it is easy to design a little risky but incentive compatible lottery for type : Of course, the interest of making the lottery little risky resides in that limited liability constraints are likely to hold. When the cost is concave instead, the ratio between gain to type and penalty to type + is above one and a riskier lottery must be used, involving that limited liability may well be an issue. First and foremost, there is a general lesson to be derived from our study. In settings with non-monotonic cost the use of correlated information has two e¤ects on contractual design. The …rst e¤ect is understood being based on the result, derived by MRC, that the incentives of any given type to mimic higher or lower types depend on the shape of the opportunity cost, which re ‡ects in what direction and to what extent the cost varies with type. When the opportunity cost is either concave or little convex, the total cost increases with type if is low, it decreases with type if is high. Hence, low types obtain a bonus if they overstate information, high types obtain it if they understate information. The converse occurs when the opportunity cost is su¢ ciently convex instead. It follows that when the principal uses informative signals in contractual design a lottery must be targeted to any given depending on whether, for that particular ; the total cost increases or decreases with type. The second e¤ect is that, for any given ; some lower types might gain in cost reimbursement by claiming ; some others might lose instead. Therefore, a lottery designed to extract the bonus available to some type below will actually grant a bene…t to some other type below : Analogous problem may arise with types above . Both e¤ects are speci…c to settings with correlated information, provided that lotteries are not used otherwise. Whereas the …rst e¤ect determines how correlated information should be exploited in presence of countervailing incentives, the second e¤ect makes screening more di¢ cult for the principal.
The …rst speci…c result of our study concerns the case in which the opportunity cost is convex. In a setting without informative signals, MRC …nd that when the opportunity cost is little convex a range of intermediate types obtain no rent, whereas rents accrue to nearly all types when the opportunity cost is su¢ ciently convex. Indeed, in the former case, countervailing incentives are strong and there is little to gain from private information. By contrast, in the latter case the potential gain is high and incentives are more clear-cut. Speci…cally, low types are willing to understate as the bonus on the opportunity cost they would obtain is great; high types are willing to overstate as the penalty on the opportunity cost they would incur is little. A substantial conclusion to the analysis of MRC is that countervailing incentives are helpful in that they enable the principal to rely on output distortions to retain surplus, thus making screening less costly. Our analysis delivers a di¤erent conclusion with regards to correlated information settings. We …nd that when the opportunity cost is su¢ ciently convex, and hence the agent displays clear-cut incentives, it is easier for the principal to construct powerful lotteries because the second e¤ect is not at work in that case. This suggests that strong countervailing incentives make screening more di¢ cult, rather than facilitating it, when informative signals are used in the contractual o¤er to the agent.
Overall, as long as the agent's level of liability is high enough to satisfy some necessary condition, …rst best is e¤ected both when the opportunity cost is convex and when it is little concave. By contrast, this is not the case when the opportunity cost is su¢ ciently concave, except in the extreme case in which the agent could be exposed to unbounded de…cits. Indeed, when the concavity is su¢ ciently pronounced the ratio between gain to type and penalty to type + is above one, and the bound on the agent's liability prevents the principal from making the lottery su¢ ciently risky to retain surplus without inducing distortions. Noticeably, whereas this is also true when the total cost is monotonic (compare Danau and Vinella [8] ), non-monotonicity further restricts the degrees of concavity for which …rst best is at reach. This is because the second e¤ect is relevant and the lottery is less powerful at extracting surplus.
Remark that strong concavity of the opportunity cost involves weak countervailing incentives for a wide range of types, and weaker and weaker such incentives moving towards the extremes of the feasible set. This suggests that when the opportunity cost is concave, unlike in the convex case, the principal prefers facing strong countervailing incentives because agency costs are lower in that case. This is in line with situations without informative signals in which, as Lewis and Sappington [15] - [16] emphasize, the principal may even want to create/reinforce countervailing incentives for an agent with concave opportunity cost, at the aim of enhancing contracting. We can thus conclude that, in correlated information settings, as long as the opportunity cost is convex, the principal dislikes strong countervailing incentives in that they make the lottery design more complicated. However, when the opportunity cost is concave the principal would rather like to face such incentives in order to a¤ord lower agency costs.
Outline
The reminder of the article is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model, we state the principal's programme and we characterize the …rst-best allocation. In section 3 we recall the principal's attainment in the absence of informative signals, as characterized by MRC. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of …rst-best implementation. After describing the optimal lottery design, we state conditions under which …rst best is attained according to the shape of the agent's opportunity cost. Mathematical details are relegated to an appendix.
The model
A risk-neutral principal contracts with a risk-neutral agent for the provision of q units of some good (or service).
Consumption of q units of the good yields a gross utility of S (q) : We assume that the function S ( ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and such that S 0 ( ) > 0 and S 00 ( ) < 0:
Furthermore, S (0) = 0 and the Inada's conditions are satis…ed.
To trade with the principal and accomplish his task, the agent incurs a total cost of
The marginal cost 2 ; ; where > > 0; captures the agent's e¢ ciency in the production activity. K ( ) represents the agent's opportunity cost of renouncing to other businesses, which depends on the agent's e¢ ciency. Taking K ( ) to be twice continuously di¤erentiable, we assume that K 0 ( ) < 0 for all because the less e¢ cient that the agent is in the relationship with the principal, the worse the outside opportunity that he faces. Moreover, we take K 00 ( ) to have a constant sign across types, which will be functional to the exposition of results below. With these properties, K ( ) is the exact counterpart of the agent's reservation utility in MRC and our analysis is thus comparable with theirs.
Information structure Nature draws and the agent observes its realization (his type) before receiving the contractual o¤er. The public beliefs about are re ‡ected in the continuously di¤erentiable density function f ( ) : The associated cumulative distribution function is denoted F ( ) : The agent's marginal cost is correlated with a random signal s (the "state" of nature). This is hard information and can be included in a legally enforceable contract. For instance, in regulatory settings the signal can be the behaviour or the market performance of another …rm, operating either in the same sector or in an analogous (possibly regulated) sector placed in a neighboring economy, which conveys information about production costs. Alternatively, the signal can be the outcome of an audit of the activity. We assume that it is drawn from the discrete support N f1; ::; ng ; where n 3; and publicly observed after the contract has been signed and the level of output has been chosen (or the output has been delivered). The degree of correlation between type and signal is commonly known prior to the contractual o¤er being made. It is measured by the probability p s ( ) of observing signal s conditional on the type being ; which we assume to be strictly positive for all s 2 N: We also take the function p s ( ) to be twice continuously di¤erentiable for all types. For reasons that will become apparent soon, we assume that there exist two signals, taken to be 1 and n; for simplicity, such that the monotonic likelihood property, which is standard in mechanism design, is partially satis…ed:
Furthermore, the conditional probabilities of the two signals are both concave in type, but they display a di¤erent degree of concavity, namely
The contractual o¤er The Revelation Principle applies and the principal can restrict attention to direct mechanisms such that the agent reports truthfully (or, equivalently, picks the contract targeted to his type within the menu o¤ered by the principal). As the signal is publicly observed ex post, it can be used to condition the compensation to the agent. For instance, when a regulator deals with two …rms with correlated costs, the compensation to the …rst …rm can be made contingent not only on its own report (or contractual choice) but also on the report delivered by the second …rm (or the latter's contractual choice), which is informative about the true cost of the …rst …rm. Formally, the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er is a pro…le of allocations fq ( ) ; t s ( )g ; 8 2 ; 8s 2 N; where q ( ) is the quantity an agent of type will produce and t s ( ) the transfer he will receive in state s: Considering both the production cost and the opportunity cost borne by the agent, the pro…t that type obtains when 0 is announced and signal s is realised, is given by
and denote the lottery designed for an agent of type as ( ) f 1 ( ) ; :::; n ( )g : As usual, it will be more convenient to consider s ( ) ; rather than t s ( ) ; as a decision variable and we shall say that the principal rewards the agent if s ( ) > 0 and punishes him if s ( ) < 0:
it becomes evident that, as is typical of correlated information settings, the payo¤ type obtains when reporting 0 in state s includes two components. The …rst is the pro…t assigned to the mimicked type in that state. The second, which is independent of the realised signal instead, is the di¤erence between the fake cost, reimbursed according to the report, and the true cost, incurred to produce the quantity recommended from the reported type. Therefore, the expected payo¤ of type announcing 0 ; which is written as
blends together a lottery with possible outcomes the pro…ts assigned to the pretended type in the di¤erent states and a …xed amount given by the di¤erence in cost reimbursement. Of course, (3) reduces to E s [ s ( )] = P s s ( ) p s ( ) ; i.e., the expected payo¤ of type is just the expected value of the lottery, if 0 = :
The principal' s programme The principal's programme is formulated as follows:
is the incentive constraint whereby type weakly prefers to tell the truth rather than claiming 0 6 = : (P C ) is the ex-ante participation constraint which ensures that type obtains a non-negative pro…t in expectation. (LL s ) is the limited liability constraint which ensures that the highest de…cit to which the agent is exposed does not exceed L > 0 in any state s: This form of limited liability represents situations in which the principal would like to avoid the agent becoming so …nancially distressed that the activity must be interrupted, at least as long as the agent does not attempt to conceal information. For instance, this is common practice in regulated industries, where L could be interpreted as an indicator of …nancial viability, beyond which the regulated …rm would go bankrupt. 4 The …rst-best allocation At the …rst-best allocation quantities and pro…ts are such that S 0 (q ( )) = and E s [ s ( )] = 0 for all 2 : Given the properties of the function S ( ) ; the …rst-best quantity is positive and unique for any given value of and the function q ( ) is continuous for all values of :
Absent informative signals, it is not possible to use lotteries and the pro…t targeted to type ; denoted ( ) ; must be set to satisfy the incentive constraint
whereby is not an attractive report to any type 0 : In addition, it must be the case that ( ) 0 to ensure participation in the contract: Because the opportunity cost is decreasing, a type 0 that pretends faces two opposite e¤ects. If > 0 ; then the lie yields a higher reimbursement on the variable cost (( 0 ) q ( ) > 0) but a lower reimbursement on the
The converse is true if < 0 : Thus, depending on the prevailing e¤ect, type 0 is eager either to overstate or to understate information vis-à-vis the principal. In particular, if there exists b 2 ; de…ned as being such that:
then one e¤ect prevails on the other if 0 < b ; and vice versa if 0 > b : Which exact e¤ect dominates on each range of types depends, in turn, on the shape of the opportunity cost. Henceforth, we take b to exist, indeed, unless di¤erently stated for presentation of some speci…c results. The optimal contract displays the following features.
(1) The output pro…le must be non-increasing in type. This is necessary to ensure that the bene…t type would obtain by claiming 0 > is lower than the penalty type 0 would incur by claiming < 0 ; and hence that either such type can be induced to release information. Notice that this is standard in any screening problems without correlated information, provided that the incentives of type and type 0 to mimic each other only depend on the variable cost and are thus unrelated to the properties of the opportunity cost.
(2) When the opportunity cost is little convex or concave (K 00 ( ) (q ( )) 0 ); the principal distorts the output levels downwards for types below b and upwards for types above b ; trading o¤ e¢ ciency and rent-extraction purposes. Given requirement (1) and with the output levels distorted in opposite directions for types in the two di¤erent ranges, pooling is optimally induced for a range of intermediate types. However, countervailing incentives do not necessarily lead to pooling. Indeed, when the opportunity cost is su¢ ciently convex (
types below b are tempted to understate information and types above b to overstate information, and the principal can a¤ord o¤ering a fully separating contract.
(3) When the opportunity cost is little convex no rent is given up to the intermediate types which are recommended the same production. This is because countervailing incentives are strong and the potential bene…ts from private information are nearly constant across types. Then, output distortions su¢ ce to ensure the agent's participation without triggering lies. This is no longer true when K ( ) is concave. In that case, countervailing incentives are strong only for intermediate types and increasingly weaker for more extreme types. Whereas the former types can be induced to tell the truth at a low (or no) cost as they are turned between the temptation to overstate and that to understate, higher information rents must be given up to the latter types, which have clear incentives to lie in one direction. On the other hand, when K ( ) is su¢ ciently convex, countervailing incentives are strong only for extreme types and increasingly weaker for more interior types, which are now those that receive higher information rents.
A neat conclusion is to be drawn from the analysis of MRC. Screening is less costly when countervailing incentives are strong. This is the case for a range of intermediate types when the cost is concave or little convex, and for extreme types when the cost is su¢ ciently convex. Particularly, whereas in the concave case countervailing incentives are su¢ ciently strong only for one intermediate type, from which all surplus is then retained, in the little convex case the range of such types is wider. Yet, the countervailing e¤ect is weaker the more pronounced that the convexity is. When the cost is su¢ ciently convex that e¤ect is strong enough to extract all surplus only for the two extreme types.
Turning to the settings with correlated information, the di¤erence between reimbursed cost and true cost, namely
is only one of the two components of the payo¤ that type 0 obtains, if it claims : There is also a second component. This is a lottery with expected value of P s s ( ) p s ( 0 ) and represents the instrument by means of which, unlike in the absence of informative signals, the principal can attain the …rst-best outcome. When the cost increases for all types (the standard case in the literature on correlated information), the lottery targeted to type is intended to extract the bonus in cost reimbursement that lower types could obtain by claiming ; without yet attracting lies from higher types. From Danau and Vinella [8] , we know what the most e¤ective lottery looks like under limited liability when the agent's cost is monotonic in type. However, we do not know whether that lottery is most e¤ective also when the cost is non-monotonic, provided in this case the di¤erence between pretended cost and true cost does not have the same sign across types, and may not have the same sign across types above and across types below the target type. To clarify this aspect, it is necessary to develop a speci…c analysis, along the lines of Danau and Vinella [8] . Once the most e¤ective lottery with non-monotonic cost is identi…ed, it will also emerge how the contract characterized by MRC is amended when the compensation to the agent is conditioned on informative signals.
those lotteries when the opportunity cost is convex and when it is concave.
The lottery design
Take any triplet of types ; ; + 2 such that < < + : Resting on the condition for full surplus extraction X s s ( ) p s ( ) = 0;
the incentive constraints IC and IC + ; whereby is an attractive report neither to type nor to type + ; are conveniently reformulated as follows:
n ( )
Under Assumption 1, the higher that n ( ) is the more eager that type is to claim : On the other hand, the lower that n ( ) is the more eager that type + is to claim : Therefore, types and + are both unwilling to claim only if the value of n ( ) is set neither too low nor too high. Taking the limit of the right-hand side of (6) and (7), respectively, as ! and + ! ; we see that the two conditions hold at once if and only if:
This is the state n pro…t such that any incentives to mimic a neighboring type are eliminated. Using (8) , (6) and (7) are respectively reformulated as
We see that (9) and (10) hold jointly only if
In the limit, (11) reduces to (9) as ! and to (10) as + ! : The incentive constraints can thus be replaced by the local incentive constraint (8), which must hold for all ; together with (11), which must hold for all triplets ; ; + : Accordingly, provided that no information rent is left to the agent, the principal's programme is reformulated as follows:
We begin by looking at (8) and (LL s ) : Consider a type such that q ( )
The easiest way of satisfying the two constraints in all states for this type is to set the pro…t in state n equal to the pro…t in all other states but 1: Accordingly, we consider the following lottery, to be denoted ( ) :
We remark that 1 ( ) is a reward, whereas s ( ) is a punishment. This structure of the lottery is explained as follows. Types below could exaggerate information to gain the di¤erence between fake and true cost. First take s ( ) as given for all signals but 1 and n: The lower that n ( ) is, the more the surplus that the principal can extract from such types through the lottery. Of course, given s ( ) ; 8s 6 = 1; n; lowering n ( ) involves raising 1 ( ) to ensure that type is willing to participate in the contract. However, this does not prevent the principal from retaining all surplus from types below ; provided that those types are more likely to draw signal n than signal 1: Therefore, n ( ) < 0 and 1 ( ) > 0: Further setting s ( ) = n ( ) ; 8s 6 = 1; n; enables the principal to minimize the punishment to which type is exposed.
Next consider a type such that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) < 0: The reasoning goes as before, except that now types above gain in terms of cost reimbursement, if they understate information. Hence, an e¤ective lottery is such that in state 1 type is punished, in state n it is rewarded, and in all other states it receives the same pro…t as in state 1 so that (LL s ) holds. This lottery, to be denoted ( ) ; is composed as follows:
Lemma 1 (8) is most likely to be satis…ed by the lottery ( ) for all such that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) < 0 and the lottery ( ) for all such that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) > 0:
Unlike the local incentive constraint (8), the global incentive constraint (11) is most likely to hold when both the pro…t assigned in state 1 and the pro…t assigned in state n; rather than only one of them, are set to di¤er from the pro…t assigned in all other states. This is because the principal can take better advantage of the correlation between signal and type, if she saturates (LL s ) ; 8s 6 = 1; n; and then uses the pro…t in state n to satisfy (8) and adjusts the pro…t in state 1 to retain all surplus. For any type this lottery, to be denoted ( ) ; looks as follows:
s ( ) = L; 8s 6 = 1; n:
Lemma 2 (11) is most likely to be satis…ed by the lottery ( ) ; 8 :
Noticeably, the pro…le of pro…ts (16) - (18) looks the same regardless of whether q ( ) + K 0 ( ) is positive or negative. Nonetheless, 1 ( ) is higher in the former case than in the latter, whereas the converse is true for n ( ) : The contractual o¤er such that all surplus is retained from the agent will, of course, di¤er depending on which one, between the pair of lotteries ( ) ; ( ) and the lottery ( ) ; is more appropriate. To see how exactly the lottery is chosen and how the non-monotonicity of the cost a¤ects that choice, suppose …rst that the cost is monotonic instead, such that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) > 0 8 : Then, as Danau and Vinella [8] show and as also emerges from our previous lemmas, the principal has to select one between the lotteries ( ) and ( ) for all types. To understand what drives the choice, it is useful to have a look at the way in which the use of lotteries helps the principal extract surplus. By announcing ; type gains an amount of q ( ) + K ( ) K in terms of cost reimbursement but it also incurs a penalty equal to the expected value of the lottery, which is negative:
On the other hand, by announcing ; type + loses an amount of + q ( )+K + K ( ) in terms of cost reimbursement but it also obtains a gain equal to the expected value of the lottery, which is now positive:
With p 1 ( ) being concave, the principal can use ( ) ; which is most likely to satisfy the limited liability constraints, if the ratio between the penalty incurred by type and the gain obtained by type + on the lottery is greater than the ratio between the gain obtained by type and the penalty incurred by type + in terms of cost reimbursement. This is the case when following condition is satis…ed:
Under (19) , there exists a negative value of n ( ) such that neither type nor type + …nds it convenient to announce . When (19) does not hold but the limited liability constraints are not saturated, rather than insisting on ( ) ; the principal should rely on the lottery ( ) to in ‡ict higher punishments, and hence to relax the con ‡ict between upward and downward incentive constraints to the utmost.
Let us now turn to the case in which the cost is non-monotonic in type. By looking at this case, it will become evident that the lottery choice is not the only contractual aspect to which the shape of the cost is relevant. The use of correlated information in agency problems with countervailing incentives has two e¤ects on contractual design.
First, as regards types with decreasing cost (q ( ) + K 0 ( ) < 0) ; the principal has to choose a lottery between ( ) and ( ) ; rather than choosing between ( ) and ( ) ; because those types obtain a bonus in terms of cost reimbursement if they understate (rather than overstating) information. Thus, the condition under which upward and downward incentive constraints are jointly satis…ed for any triplet ; ;
+ is speci…ed as follows:
When (20) holds, there exists a negative value of 1 ( ) such that is an attractive report neither to type nor to type + . Once again, when (20) fails to hold and provided that the limited liability constraints are not saturated, the principal should rather rely on the lottery ( ) : Overall, the choice is between ( ) and ( ) for types such that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) > 0 and between ( ) and ( ) for types such that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) < 0: As shown by MRC, it is the shape of K ( ) what determines the ranges of types with increasing and decreasing cost. In our case, the shape of K ( ) determines whether the lottery ( ) or ( ) should be used for the types in the two ranges, when (19) and (20) are not an issue.
Second, whereas with a monotonic cost all types below (above) lose in terms of cost reimbursement and gain in terms of lottery, with a non-monotonic cost this may or may not be the case. To clarify this aspect, it is useful to de…ne h ( ) such that:
That is, h ( ) is the type which neither gains nor loses in terms of cost reimbursement, if it mimics type : Obviously, such a type does not exist with a monotonic cost. First take such that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) < 0: By pretending ; type + incurs a penalty in cost reimbursement if + < h ( ) but not otherwise. Hence, if + > h ( ) ; then reporting would be bene…cial to type + in terms of both cost reimbursement and lottery. Next take such that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) > 0:
By pretending ; type + would lose on the lottery; in addition, it would also lose on the cost reimbursement if h ( ) < + : To ascertain whether all types below (above) get a bonus by pretending ; or they all lose, it is necessary to assess how h ( ) compares with : Again, this is related to the shape of the cost, in turn.
The various cases identi…ed by the lemma are better understood by looking at the graphs in Figure 4 .1. In each graph, the thick line represents q ( ) + K 0 ( ) as a function of 2 :
Each of the two dashed lines represents q ( ) +
as a function of x 2 for some given value of ; taken to be 1 < b for the upper line and 2 > b for the other. These are the values of at which the thick line and each of the two dashed lines cross. The values of x at which the dashed lines cross the horizontal axis are h ( 1 ) and h ( 2 ) : Graph (i) shows that when K ( ) is concave, by reporting 1 < b ; any type x < 1 and any type x 2 ( 1 ; h ( 1 )) gets a prize in cost reimbursement because q ( 1 ) +
> 0 for all types in those ranges; by contrast, any type x > h ( 1 ) faces a penalty in cost reimbursement because q ( 1 ) +
> 0; whereas any type x > h ( 2 ) ; whether below or above 2 ; faces a penalty because q ( 2 )+
Graphs (ii) and (iii) are interpreted in a similar manner, mutatis mutandis.
Taking the two e¤ects together, it is not surprising that the shape of K ( ) determines the principal's contractual attainments, which we now turn to present.
K ( ) convex
Lemma 4 If K 00 ( ) > 0; then (24) is satis…ed and full surplus extraction is most likely to be attained through the lottery ( ) for all such that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) > 0 and the lottery ( ) for all such that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) < 0:
According to this lemma, it is not an issue to attain global incentive compatibility when the opportunity cost is convex, regardless of the exact degree of convexity. When K ( ) is little convex, the total cost changes little as type changes (the thick line in graph (ii) in Figure 4 .1), entailing that there is little to gain, in terms of cost reimbursement, from a lie. Thus, (24) can be satis…ed with the little risky lotteries ( ) and ( ) : When K ( ) is su¢ ciently convex, the total cost varies more with type (the thick line in graph (iii) of Figure 4 .1). This entails that countervailing incentives are weaker and a lie is potentially more convenient in terms of cost reimbursement. However, it is easier for the principal to induce information release at no cost because the incentives to lies are opposite to those displayed with other shapes of K ( ) ; and hence the second e¤ect previously explained is not at work. To illustrate, take type + < h ( ) and suppose that < b so that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) < 0: Then, ( ) is used. With K ( ) being su¢ ciently convex, understatement yields a double penalty to type + ; in terms of both lottery and cost reimbursement, and is thus easily prevented. This all compares interestingly with settings without correlated information. In the latter, the principal …nds it more costly to elicit information when the agent's opportunity cost is su¢ ciently convex and countervailing incentives are weak. In our framework, weak countervailing incentives associated with a su¢ ciently convex opportunity cost facilitates the use of lotteries to retain surplus and it su¢ ces that local incentive constraints be satis…ed. The following result is obtained.
Proposition 1 Suppose that K 00 ( ) 0: Then, …rst best is implemented if and only if:
This result compares with Proposition 2 in Gary-Bobo and Spiegel [11] . They assume that the agent's cost is increasing and convex for all types. In that case, in spite of the agent being protected by limited liability, …rst best is at hand provided that local incentive constraints hold. When the cost is non-monotonic but still convex in type there is only one novel aspect to that …nding: local incentive compatibility requires targeting a di¤erent lottery to the types with decreasing cost.
K ( ) concave
When the opportunity cost is concave, the lottery that is most likely to extract surplus under limited liability depends on the exact degree of concavity. This is at odds with settings without correlated information (MRC) but in line with settings with correlated information and monotonic cost (Danau and Vinella [8] ). Due to the properties of the conditional probabilities of signals 1 and n; the lotteries ( ) and ( ) may still be e¤ective when the concavity of K ( ) is little pronounced, provided that (19) and (20) are satis…ed. However, this is not true otherwise. Besides, even when K ( ) is little concave full surplus extraction with those lotteries cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, whether or not that outcome is achieved will depend on how the e¤ects evidenced by Lemma 3 are at work. Take < b ; for instance. Then, h ( ) > b and by using ( ) the principal will succeed in discouraging types in ( ; h ( )) from understating information because, following that lie, those types would lose more on cost reimbursement than could they gain on the lottery. However, types above h ( ) will …nd it convenient to claim as they would gain on both components of their payo¤s (recall that, on the opposite, types above h ( ) incur a double penalty when K ( ) is su¢ ciently convex). Noticeably, replacing ( ) with ( ) would not be a solution because ( ) would then attract lies from types in ( ; h ( )) : The principal does not extract all surplus unless the lottery ( ) is adopted. In the next lemma we present the best lottery to be targeted to di¤erent ranges of types, according to whether or not there exists a range of types ( ; h ( )) if < b ; and a range of types (h ( ) ; ) if > b .
Lemma 5 Suppose that K 00 ( ) < 0:
The lottery that is most likely to extract all surplus is ( ) when (19) holds, and ( ) otherwise.
(ii) > b and h ( ) = 2 ; : The lottery that is most likely to extract all surplus is ( ) when (20) holds, and ( ) otherwise. (iii) h ( ) 2 ; : The lottery that is most likely to extract all surplus is ( ) :
In substance, ( ) is more e¤ective than a lottery yielding the same punishment in all states but one not only when K ( ) is too concave to have (19) or (20) satis…ed, but also when non-monotonicity of the total cost makes global incentive compatibility di¢ cult to attain (formally, when h ( ) 2 ; ): We now derive conditions under which …rst best is implemented, according to the optimal lotteries to be targeted to di¤erent ranges of types for di¤erent degrees of concavity of K ( ) : Proposition 2 Take K 00 ( ) < 0: First best is implemented if and only if either:
(i) (19) and (22) hold for b ; (20) and (23) hold for b ; and h ( ) = 2 ; ; or (ii) the following condition holds for all triplets ; ; + :
Proposition 1 enriches Proposition 1 in Danau and Vinella [8] by considering also the case in which the agent's total cost is non-monotonic in type. To highlight what changes with a non-monotonic cost, we …rst restate that result in the context of this study. When the cost increases with type on the whole support the principal should adopt either the lottery ( ) ; which is most likely to attain local incentive compatibility, or the lottery ( ) ; which is most likely to avoid con ‡icts between upward and downward incentive constraints. The former is preferable with a mild concavity of the cost, the latter with a more pronounced concavity. The choice between ( ) and ( ) explains the alternative conditions required in Corollary 1. The result in Proposition 1 is similar in this respect. Actually, the choice between the lotteries ( ) and ( ) ; on one side, and that of ( ) ; on the other, depend on the degree of concavity of the opportunity cost. This explains why in Proposition 1 there are two pairs of relevant conditions, namely (22) and ( There are nonetheless two essential di¤erences between Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. In the framework of Proposition 1, the lottery ( ) is more likely to be preferable when the restrictions imposed by the non-monotonicity of the cost are important (formally, when h ( ) 2 ; ); an issue which is of course absent in the context of Corollary 1. Less evident is that if the lottery ( ) is adopted, then the relevant condition (24) is not equally tight when the cost is monotonic and when it is not. As stated in the next corollary, for some intermediate degree of concavity of K ( ) ; the principal attains the …rst-best outcome through the lottery ( ) when the cost increases for all types ((24) holds) but this is not necessarily the case otherwise.
Corollary 2 Take K 00 ( ) < 0:
(i) Suppose that q ( ) + K 0 ( ) > 0 8 and that K( ) is "su¢ ciently little concave" to have
Then, (24) holds for all triplets ; ; + :
is "su¢ ciently little concave" that 1. (25) holds if either x > and x > h ( ) or x < and x < h ( ) ;
Then, (24) holds for all triplets ; ; + if and only if
The bonus in cost reimbursement, which the agent can appropriate by pretending a type that is "distant" from the true type, is lower the less concave that the opportunity cost is. Thus, as long as the concavity of K( ) is su¢ ciently mild, correlated information is a powerful tool to make such a lie unpro…table. That is, lotteries can be used to extract the associated bene…t, without yet attracting lies from other types which could rather gain in terms of lottery. Actually, this is true both when the total cost is monotonic -case (i) in Corollary 2 -and when it is not -case (ii) -but not to the same extent. Whereas in the former case it is not complicated to ensure that upward and downward incentive constraints are jointly satis…ed, di¢ culties can arise in the latter case instead. To see this, …rst consider < b and suppose that the principal designs a lottery for type such that no type obtains any bene…t if it announces : Then, one cannot take for granted that such a lottery will also be unattractive to type + : For instance, if + > b ; then by reporting type + might gain on both the lottery and the cost reimbursement, provided that the total cost decreases for types in ( b ;
In a similar fashion, when > b a lottery designed for type in such a way that it is unattractive to type + ; may end up attracting some type < b < : As a result, in case (ii) the …rst-best outcome is not at reach unless the agent can be exposed to higher de…cits than in case (i) : Indeed, the agent must have a su¢ ciently deep pocket for the relevant condition between (27) and (28) to be satis…ed, and it turns out that those two conditions are tighter than their counterparts with a monotonic cost, namely (25) and (26). The next corollary is an implication of Lemma (8) and (11) . When K( ) is su¢ ciently concave to have ( ) and ( ) ine¤ective at implementing …rst best, the principal should opt for ( ) : Yet, this lottery does not make a better job unless the agent's liability is high enough. (6) and (7) and rearranging, we obtain:
As ! and + ! these conditions are jointly satis…ed if and only if n ( ) is expressed as in (8) . (13) is obtained because as n ( ) = s ( ) ; 8s 6 = 1; n: Using this in P s s ( ) p s ( ) = 0; we …nd (12) .
and hence we can formulate IC and IC + as follows:
1 ( )
Setting 1 ( ) = s ( ) in these inequalities yields:
As ! and + ! these conditions are jointly satis…ed if and only if 1 ( ) is given by:
Because 1 ( ) = s ( ) ; 8s 6 = 1; n; (15) is obtained. Using this in n ( ) = P s6 =n s ( ) p s ( ) =p n ( ) we derive (14) . (8) and rearranging, we obtain (17). From
In this expression we use (17), together with s ( ) = L; 8s 6 = 1; n; to derive (16) .
B Proof of Lemma 3
Here and in subsequent proofs, we will be based on the equivalence between K 00 ( ) < 0 and the following:
(I) < b : Using (35) and (36), we deduce the following:
By the de…nition of h ( ) ; namely q ( ) +
we further deduce the following:
Recall that for < b it is q ( ) + K 0 ( ) < 0 if and only if K 00 ( ) (q ( )) 0 : We use this in (37) and (38) to deduce the following:
and hence h ( ) > :
We use this in (37) and (38) to deduce the following:
C Proof of Lemma 4
Recall that setting n ( ) = s ( ) ; IC and IC + are rewritten as (29) and (30). 9 n ( ) such that both conditions hold if and only if:
From (36), we have
> 0 so that (39) is rewritten as (19) . Because p 00 1 ( ) < 0 under (2), the right-hand side of (19) is above one. Because K 00 ( ) > 0 implies 
From (35) and (36), we have
we also have q ( )
which is true because h ( ) < b < and < + :
Recall from Lemma 3 that < h ( ) : If + < h ( ) ; then the right-hand side of (40) is negative. The left-hand side of (40) is negative as well. Hence, (40) is rewritten as (20) . Because p 00 n ( ) < 0 under (2), the left-hand side of (20) is below 1: Moreover, because K 00 ( ) > 0; the right-hand side of (20) is above 1: Hence, (20) is satis…ed.
39) is rewritten as (19) . Because p 00 1 ( ) < 0 under (2), the right-hand side of (19) is higher than 1: Because K 00 ( ) > 0; the left-hand side of (19) is lower than 1: Hence, (19) holds.
D Proof of Proposition 1
For < b the optimal lottery is ( ) (Lemma 4). (LL s ) is satis…ed for all types if and only if s ( ) L; 8 ; 8s 6 = 1: Using (13), this inequality is rewritten as (22) . Analogously, for > b the optimal lottery is ( ) (Lemma 4). (LL s ) is satis…ed for all types if and only if s ( ) L; 8 ; 8s 6 = n: Using (15), this inequality is rewritten as (23) .
E Proof of Lemma 5
(I) < b : In this case, q ( ) + K 0 ( ) > 0 and the choice is between ( ) and ( ) (Lemma 1 and 2). Because K 00 ( ) < 0 it follows from (35) that
and (39) is rewritten as (19) . Both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (19) 
and (40) is rewritten as (20) . With p 00 n ( ) < 0; the left-hand side of (20) is below 1:
; the right-hand side of (20) is below 1 as well. Hence, we cannot conclude that (20) is satis…ed and it must be veri…ed. If (20) is satis…ed, and hence (11) is satis…ed with ( ) ; then ( ) is optimal (Lemma 1 and 2). If h ( ) ; then with analogous reasoning we deduce that q ( ) + K( ) K( ) > 0; involving that the left-hand side of (40) is positive and the condition is violated. Hence, (11) is not satis…ed with ( ) and ( ) is optimal.
F Proof of Proposition 2
Derivation of (24) Under (1), the di¤erence in the brackets multiplied by s ( ) p s ( ) in (11) is negative for all triplets ; ; + : Hence, (11) is weakest when s ( ) = L; 8s 6 = 1; n: Replacing these values, (11) is reformulated as (24) .
Limited liability satis…ed
We are left with verifying (LL 1 ) and (LL n ) : (22)). From (16), we see that (LL 1 ) holds because
From (17), we see that (LL n ) holds because q ( )+K 0 ( ) < 0: Overall, (LL 1 ) and (LL n ) are satis…ed 8 :
G Proof of Corollary 2
De…ne the functions:
and g ( ) such that q ( )+K 0 (g ( )) = 0: We will identify the conditions under which ' 0 (x) 0 for x = and for x = + : We have ' 0 (x) 0 if and only if:
Under (1),
> 0 if and only if x < : Hence, (41) is equivalent to the following pair of conditions: (26) hold, then the left-hand side of (24) increases with and decreases with + : As the right-hand side of (24) (24) is tighter at than at g ( ) ; it is tighter at h ( ) than at g ( ) ; it is tighter at h ( ) than at : To verify if (24) is tightest as + ! we need to recall the de…nition of ' (x) and check whether:
(44) is equivalent to:
This is impossible because the left-hand side is positive. Hence, the left-hand side of (24) is highest for + = h ( ) ; in which case ' + = 0: Because the right-hand side of (24) is lowest for + ! ; we need to compare (24) for + = h ( ) and for + ! : For + = h ( ) and ! (24) is rewritten as (27). For + ! (24) reduces to 0 0; and hence it is satis…ed as an identity. Therefore, (24) (24) is tighter at than at g ( ) ; it is tighter at h ( ) than at g ( ) ; it is tighter at h ( ) than at : To verify if (24) is tightest as ! we need to check if:
(45) is equivalent to:
which is not true because the left-hand side is negative. As in (1) ; we need to verify (24) for = h ( ) : Provided that + ! ; (24) is rewritten as the converse of (27), namely as (28).
H Proof of Corollary 3
(27) implies (22) Multiply both sides of (27) by the positive di¤erence
and rearrange to obtain
As the right-hand side is lower than Lp 0 1 ( )=p 1 ( ); this is tighter than (22) if and only if
Multiplying both sides by
> 0 and rearranging, we obtain [(p 1 (h ( )) p 1 ( )) /p 1 ( ) ] > 0; which is true by (1).
(28) implies (23) Multiply both sides of (28) by the positive di¤erence p 0 1 ( ) p 1 ( ) p 0 n ( ) pn( ) and rearrange to obtain
(1 p n ( )) p
